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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Because of the multiplicity of the parties and the roles 
they played, and in the interest of clarity and brevity, 
plaintiff and respondent, Mallory Engineering, Inc., will be 
designated hereafter simply as "Mallory"; defendant, counter-
claimant, cross-claimant, respondent and appellant, Ted R. Brown 
& Associates, Inc., will be designated simply as "Brown"; and 
defendant, cross-defendant, counterclaimant and appellant, Valad 
Electric Heating Corporation, will be designated simply as 
"Valad". 
Abbreviations which will be used are: Record - "R"; 
Transcript - "T"; line or lines - "lns"; Exhibit - "Ex." or 
"Exs."; Purchase Order - "P.O."; kilowatt - "KW"; and drawing -
"Dwg". 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The action involves a contract by which Brown sold Mallory 
some electrical heaters. The heaters were to have met specific 
performance criteria furnished by Mallory. Brown purchased the 
heaters from Valad, the manufacturer, and then resold them to 
Mallory. Valad, at Brown's instructions, shipped the heaters 
directly to Mallory. Valad also, as required, certified in 
writing directly to Mallory, that the heaters would in fact meet 
the required performance criteria. The heaters, when delivered, 
did not meet the required performance criteria nor were they 
-2-
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timely shipped. The foregoing defaults gave rise to Mallory's 
claims against both Brown, who sold Mallory the heaters, and 
against Valad, the manufacturer, who certified the heaters' 
performance to Mallory. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial commenced January 19, 1976, and continued through 
January 29, 1976, for seven actual trial days. The trial was 
to the Court sitting without a jury. By stipulation the case 
was bifurcated and tried first as to the issue of liability and 
next as to the issue of damages. 
At the conclusion of the trial the Court took the matter 
under advisement for the purpose of allowing all parties to 
submit post-trial briefs. Those briefs now are part of the 
record in this case. 
After having considered the evidence and testimony adduced 
at the trial as well as the law applicable thereto, the argu-
ments of counsel, the proposed findings, conclusions and 
judgments, and all objections raised thereto, the Court on July 
14, 1977, awarded judgments in favor of Mallory against both 
Brown and Valad. The Court also awarded judgment in favor of 
Brown against Valad and dismissed the counterclaim and cross-
complaint of Valad. The issues which were raised by the amended 
counterclaim which the Court, during the course of the trial, 
permitted Brown to assert against Mallory, were reserved for 
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future trial. (R. 678-9) 
On July 22, 1977, the Court made and entered an order denying 
the motion of Brown and Valad for a new trial. (R. 680-1) 
On November 16, 1977, the Court made and entered an amended 
judgment which basically was the same as the foregoing judgments. 
but which specifically limited the total liability of Valad to 
the loss suffered by Mallory plus the loss suffered by Brown. 
(R. 695-6) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mallory seeks affirmance of the judgments made by the 
District Court in Mallory's favor against both Brown and Valad. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the statement of facts set forth in Valad's and 
Brown's briefs portray a general scenario of the situation 
giving rise to Mallory's claims, as was the situation in Water-
gate, both Brown and Valad have slanted the facts by pointing 
the accusing finger of blame at the other in an effort to 
exculpate itself from liability. This is particularly true in 
Brown's case wherein efforts were and are still being made to 
characterize Brown as a mere "conduit" or "intermediary". 
Mallory accordingly elects to make its own statement of facts. 
Mallory is a specialty manufacturing firm which had 
contracted with the United States Government to build some 
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environmental test units. (T. 4-10 and Exs. 1, 2 and 3) The 
units, as part of their essential components, required special 
electrical heaters. Mallory had previously purchased the 
heaters from Chromalox Electric and Regan Engineering. (R. 14) 
Prior to the fiasco involving the Valad heaters which are 
the subject matter of this case, Mallory had never purchased any 
heaters from Brown. Previously, however, Mallory had purchased 
several thousands of dollars of other equipment and instrumenta-
tion devices from Brown. Carl Nyman, Brown's employee, wanted 
the opportunity to quote prices to Mallory for the heaters 
Mallory needed for the environmental test units Mallory was 
building for the United States Government. (T. 97) In this 
regard Mallory was concerned about securing satisfactory heaters 
for the very best price obtainable. Brown, on the other hand, 
was interested in making a profit by selling heaters to Mallory. 
With reference to the heaters which are the subject matter of 
this lawsuit the transcript shows (T. 10): 
Q. (By Mr. Alston) Mr. Farber, I show you what, for 
identification purposes, has been marked Exhibit 
No. 4 and ask if you can tell us what that exhibit 
is? 
(Emphasis supplied) 
This criteria is based upon the specification 
requirements we had to meet in order to fulfill 
our contract with the Government .... 
Thereafter, Brown furnished quotes which, among other things, 
-5-
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set forth prices and delivery dates for heaters of the specified 
criteria which Brown wanted to sell Mallory. (T. 10-11 and 220 
as well as Exs. 4, 9, 12 and 14) After receiving the quotes from 
Brown, and under date of 12/14/1972, Mallory submitted its 
P.O. 4016 to Brown for some 15 KW and 21 KW heaters. (T. 18, 
Ex. 9) The very next day Brown, on its letterhead stationery, 
submitted its own P.O. 6730 to Valad. Brown's P.O. however 
was for only the 21 KW heater. (T. 20, Ex, 10) Subsequently 
Brown on 12/20/1972 sent Valad a memorandum in which reference 
was made to Brown's P.O. 6730.(Ex. 10) This added some 15 KW 
heaters to Brown's P.O. for the 21 KW heaters. (T. 22-23 and 
Ex. 11) 
Under date of 12/26/72 Mallory submitted its P.O. 4047 to 
Brown for some 50 KW and 12 KW heaters. (T. 23-24, Ex. 12) As 
it previously did with Mallory's P.O. to Brown for the 15 KW and 
the 21 KW heaters, Brown, on its letterhead stationery, there-
upon submitted its own P.O. 6754 to Valad for those heaters. (T. 25, 
Ex. 13) 
As to the two 36 KW heaters which are also the subject matter 
of this case, Mallory on 2/8/1973 submitted Brown its P.O. 4241, 
designated by Lee Farber of Mallory as a "confirming purchase 
order". (T. 27, Ex. 14) The preceding day, 2/7/1973, Brown, as 
it had done before in connection with its P.O.s to Valad for the 
other heaters, on its letterhead stationery, submitted its own 
P.O. 7269 to Valad for those heaters. 
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The oral testimony and documentary evidence in the record 
is undisputed that the heaters were defective in several 
particulars. They were not timely delivered. They were deficient 
in capacity and exceeded the sheath temperatures expressly set 
forth in the specified performance criteria. 
Although Valad was given every opportunity to correct the 
defective heaters it manufactured and shipped direct to Mallory 
at Brown's request, thereby minimizing the damages it had 
already caused and was continuing to cause Mallory, it failed 
and refused to do so. Other than urge Valad to do something 
to minimize the damages which were accruing as a direct and 
proximate result of the defectively manufactured heaters, Brown 
did nothing. Brown simply defaulted on its contract with 
Mallory to sell and deliver or have delivered to Mallory heaters 
meeting specific performance criteria. 
The above are the basic facts giving rise to Mallory's 
claims against both Brown and Valad. Where deemed necessary, 
additional facts will be set forth in this brief to support 
the points argued by Mallory. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE UTAH COURT DOES HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT VALAD 
In this case there should be no question but that Valad in 
fact subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court. 
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In enacting the Utah long-arm statute the Legislature made 
the express policy determination explicitly set forth in Sec. 
78-27-22 UCA 1953 that: 
" ... the public interest demands the state provide 
its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons who through certain 
minimal contacts with this state incur obligations 
to citizens entitled to the state's protection .. II 
The Legislature in Sec. 78-27-24 then enumerated those acts which 
would subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Court. In part that section provides: 
"Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, whether 
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in per-
son or through an agent does any of the following enum-
erated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his 
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this 
state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; ... " 
An enlightened interpretation of the foregoing Utah long-
arm statute was made by this Court in the recent case of Abbott 
GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 578 P2d 850. In 
the Abbott case, a unanimous Court speaking through Justice 
Wilkins said: 
"While it is true that this Court has stated that "if 
there is any difference between what is stated as the 
'doing business' and the 'minimal contact' tests it 
is probably more in semantics than in substance," we 
now conclude that from an examination of many individual 
cases concerning jurisdictional matters, including the 
present one there can well be a significant and controlling 
difference in those two concepts." 
-8-
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In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the action in the 
Abbott case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant, and in remanding the case to resolve the 
conflicts of facts set forth in the affidavits filed by the 
respective parties upon which affidavits the case was decided, 
this Court said: 
"The District Court, after remand, should as heretofore 
directed, conduct a hearing to resolve the conflicts 
of facts stated in the affidavits filed by the parties. 
And that hearing should be governed by inquiries into 
and a measurement of (a) the nature and quality of 
Piper's acts (b) whether Piper engaged in purposeful 
- rather than unintentional - acts in order to avail 
itself of the privileges and protections here (and the 
substance - not just form - of Piper's business relation-
ship and acts should be ascertained), and (c) any 
other relevant matters bearing on 'notions of fair play 
and substantial justice'." 
The facts determinative of the Utah Court's jurisdiction 
over Valad in this case are clear cut and undisputed. Valad 
did the specific acts which the Legislature said would subject 
a nonresident to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court. Valad 
contracted with Brown to supply goods (electrical heaters) which 
Brown sold Mallory. Valad also expressly warranted in writing 
by its Certificates of Certification that the heaters would meet 
certain performance criteria which the heaters did not. As a 
direct and proximate result of the failure of the heaters to meet 
the required performance criteria, substantial injury and damage 
was caused Mallory. 
The selling and supplying of the heaters by Valad to Brown 
for resale by Brown to Mallory was a purposeful and not an 
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unintentional act. It was done only after many deliberate 
negotiations had taken place between Brown and Valad. Further-
more, the warranty Valad made by virtue of its Certificates of 
Certification was purposeful and not unintentional. The warranty 
was made by Valad so as to be in compliance with the express 
condition of the contract Valad had with Brown. Considering 
the foregoing purposeful deliberate acts on the part of Valad, 
"notions of fair play and substantial justice" dictate that the 
Utah Court does and did have jurisdiction over Valad. 
An examination of the record clearly evidences that by 
the pleadings Valad submitted, as well as the appearances Valad 
made (where its entire case was thoroughly aired), Valad 
subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah Court. So as 
not to belabor this point, Mallory agrees with and by reference 
hereby adopts the argument so ably set forth in the brief of 
Brown in this regard. 
A not insignificant fact too is that even before Valad 
submitted any pleadings, Godfrey P. Schmidt, the attorney for 
Valad, by telegram, requested a two-week extension of time which 
was granted. The cross telegrams appear in the record at pages 
126- 7. 
Considering the totality of all of the foregoing, Valad's 
contention that it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Court is without merit. 
-10-
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Point II 
BROWN WAS NOT MERELY A "CONDUIT" OR "INTERMEDIARY" BUT 
IN FACT CONTRACTED TO SELL MALLORY HEATERS WHICH WOULD 
MEET SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CRITERIA. HOWEVER, BROWN DE-
FAULTED ON THAT CONTRACT CAUSING MALLORY LOSS & DAMAGE 
Brown endeavors to avoid any responsibility or liability 
by asserting that it was solely a "conduit" or "intermediary" 
in the entire transaction who merely transmitted Mallory's 
heater criteria to Valad, the manufacturer of the heaters. At 
page 18 of Brown's brief the statement is made that " ... all 
concerned knew that, in fact, Brown was not purchasing the 
heaters and reselling them, but was simply serving as an 
intermediary ... ". This assertion is simply not true. 
A careful and objective analysis of the record won't support 
Brown's contention in this regard. On the contrary, the record 
demonstrates rather conclusively that Brown was more than a mere 
"conduit" or "intermediary", and, in fact, that Brown was the 
actual seller of the heaters to Mallory. 
Prior to the fiasco involving the Valad heaters, Mallory 
had never purchased any heaters from Brown but had purchased 
several thousands of dollars of other equipment and instrtm1enta-
tion from Brown. (T. 14 and 97) Brown no doubt made a profit on 
those sales and would no doubt make a profit on a sale to 
Mallory of the heaters which Mallory needed for the environmental 
units Mallory was making for the Government. 
Carl Nyman, who was Brown's chief negotiator between Brown 
and Mallory as well as between Brown and Valad, admitted that 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he never represented he was an "agent", "representative", 
"intermediary" or "conduit" for Mallory. On cross-examination 
by Valad's attorney he said (T. 351): 
Q. Did you ever represent to Valad in so many words that 
you were an agent or representative of Brown - of 
Mallory? 
A. I don't recall ever having used such a representation 
or discussion. 
Q. Or did you ever represent to Valad that you were an 
intermediary for Mallory or a conduit for Mallory? 
A. I don't recall having used that terminology. 
Mr. Nyman wanted an opportunity to quote prices on the 
heaters for the environmental units Mallory had heretofore 
purchased from Chromalox Electric or Regan Engineering. (T. 14) 
With reference to the initial contact between Brown and Mallory, 
Lee Farber, President and General Manager, stated on cross-exam-
ination by Brown's attorney (T. 96): 
Q. Mr. Farber, who in Mallory's organization contacted 
Ted R. Brown with regard to the Government job that 
is the question here? 
A. Who contacted Brown? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I am not certain that Mallory did contact Brown. I 
think Brown contacted Mallory. 
To enable Brown to furnish quotes on heater prices, Mallory 
furnished specific heater performance criteria to Brown. (T. 10 
and Ex. 4) The testimony of Mr. Farber in this regard is (T. 10): 
Q. (By Mr. Alston) Mr. Farber, I show you what •. f~r 
identification purposes, has been marked Exhibit 
No. 4 and ask if you can tell us what the exhibit is? 
MR. FARBER: Exhibit No. 4 is entitled Electrical Heater 
Criteria. And this was criteria that I re ared and 
submitted to Mr. Car Nyman o t e Te R. Brown Company 
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him understand what we 
se us eaters on Jo . 
After receiving the heater criteria Brown secured price 
quotes from Valad on the Valad heaters, which heaters were of an 
entirely different type than the heaters Mallory previously 
used and had purchased from Chromalox Electric or Regan 
Engineering. Upon receipt of the price quotes from Brown on 
the Valad type heater, Mallory submitted to Brown its P.O.s 
4016. 4047 and 4241 for some 15KW,, 21 KW, 50 KW, 12 KW and 36 
KW heaters. (Exs. 9, 12 and 14) Rather than just send copies 
of Mallory's P.O.s to Valad with a transmittal letter, Brown sent 
Valad its P.O.s on Brown's own letterhead stationery. These 
were Brown's P.O.s 6730 (Ex. 10), 6754 (Ex. 13), and 7269 
(Ex. 15). 
A comparison of the Mallory and Brown P.O.s for the very 
same heaters shows that the Brown P.O.s are not mere copies of 
the Mallory P.O.s but that there are some significant differences 
between them. This is evidenced by the uncontradicted testimony 
of Mr. Farber elicited by Brown's attorney as follows (T. 97-8): 
Q. You did not, at any time, consider that Ted R. Brown 
& Associates were fabricating manufacturing or in any 
way designing those heaters? 
A. Prior to seeing all of the Court documents and exhibits, 
it was my understanding that Mr. Nyman was not going 
to engineer or design anything on the heaters. But I 
am not so sure now after I have seen the purchase 
orders that he issued to Valad. 
Q. The relationshi that ou initiated with Brown was 
not one ase upon t eir per arming any esign service 
for you on those heaters? (Emphasis supplied) 
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A. As far as I was concerned the relationship that existed 
with Brown is that Brown wanted to sell us heaters and 
that we wanted to buy them. (Emphasis supplied) 
On each of the Brown P.O.s, right after the name Valad 
Electric Heating Co., to whom each of the Brown P.O.s was 
directed, appears the following: 
"PLEASE ENTER OUR ORDER FOR THE FOLLOWING" (Emphasis 
supplied). There is not indication of any kind whatsoever on any 
of Brown's P.O.s that Brown was submitting a purchase order 
as "agent", "Intermediary" or in any other capacity for and 
on behalf of what Brown now endeavors to assert was Brown's 
so-called "principal", namely: Mallory. The language is clear 
and unequivocal. The P.0.s state that they are our (Brown's) 
P.O.s. The instructions simply say "ship to" Mallory Engineering. 
Valad's consistently repeated statements throughout the 
record that Brown was its customer (purchaser or vendee), which 
incidentally are uncontroverted, is further evidence that as 
between Brown and Mallory, with reference to the heaters which 
are the subject matter of this case, Brown was the seller or 
vendor and Mallory was the purchaser or vendee not of Valad 
but of Brown. This seller-purchaser arrangement as between Brown 
and Mallory is further substantiated by the plain, unambiguous 
language on all of Brown's P.O.s. All of them say: "Ordered 
by Carl Nyman", and they, in turn, are all signed by Brown's 
Purchasing Agent. None of Brown's P.0.s say: "Ordered for 
Mallory by Brown", the "agent" or "intermediary" for Mallory, 
the principal of Brown. Furthermore, all of Brown's P.O.s say: 
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"BILL TO: Ted R. Brown & Assoc., P.O. Box 1356, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84110". They do not say bill our principal, 
Mallory, for whom Brown is acting as "agent", "representative" 
or "intermediary" /.us, Brown. 
While not binding on this Court, during the course of the 
trial, the District Court made several observations as to what 
in fact the testimony and doctnnentary evidence indicated the 
relationship between Brown and Mallory was. At one point in 
the trial the Court said (T. 294): 
Well, I know what the relationship between the plaintiff 
and Brown is. That's evident from the exhibits, and that's 
vendor-vendee, at least in the initial stages. There was 
testimony that they contacted Brown - I believe Brown 
contacted Mallory in the initial stages and they entered 
into some ne otiations to urchase heaters to certain 
criteria. Emp asis supp ie 
Furthermore, in responding to Brown's contention that Carl Nyman, 
for and on behalf of Brown, was acting solely as an "intermediary", 
the Court said: 
Well, he did something more than just forward Mallory's 
purchase order. 
Later, the Court said (T. 644): 
Now, wait a minute. He went further than that. It 
wasn't a question of him (Nyman) just saying to Mallory 
"Look. You can get this work done at Valad Electric 
in New York," and walking away from it. They partici-
pated actively all the way through the negotiations. 
The response which Valad's attorney made during the trial 
to the "conduit" or "intermediary" theory argued by Brown's 
attorney is enlightening as well as persuasive. It's found at 
page 305 of the transcript and is as follows: 
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MR. SCHMIDT: 
I'd like to go back to their (Brown's) cross-complaint. 
The cross-complaint uses two words to signify the status 
of Brown. One is intermediary. And the other is conduit, 
c-o-n-d-u-i-t. 
I think the word intermediary is not very illuminating 
because there are very many kinds of intermediary. And 
there is another word in the picture that has been used 
today. And that is - and it's been used before in this 
case. And that is it was for transmittal only that Brown 
acted. In other words it seemed to me, if I understood 
that argument correctly, that Brown was a kind of letter 
carrier for Mallory. 
Well, I asked myself, can a letter carrier sue an addressee? 
Can an intermediary or a conduit, if that's what happened .. 
Contrary to the statements and inferences in Brown's brief, 
there is nothing inconsistent in a vendor-vendee relationship 
which would preclude the vendee in that relationship from demanding 
a "certification" from the "manufacturer" as to the performance 
of the item or items being purchased. Nor is there anything in 
such a relationship which would preclude the vendee from making 
direct contact with the "manufacturer" if there was any trouble 
or defect with respect to any item or items. Such demands and 
contacts are entirely consistent and in harmony with a vendor-
vendee relationship. Furthermore, the evidence in this case 
is uncontradicted that when trouble arose with the Valad heaters, 
Carl Nyman of Brown specifically requested that Lee Farber of 
Mallory contact Valad directly and firsthand to explain the 
problem. (T. 75) 
There is evidence and testimony in the record about some 
preliminary negotiations between Valad and Brown pointing toward 
the possibility of Brown possibly becoming Valad's "agent" or 
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"sales representative" in Utah. This never materialized. 
More than likely the reason the "agent" or "sales representa-
tive" relationship never materialized between Valad and Brown 
was because of the modest 5% to 10% maximum corrnnission Brown 
would have derived under such an arrangement. However, by 
Brown purchasing the heaters from Valad as it did, and 
reselling the heaters to Mallory as it did, Brown's margin of 
profit on the transaction ranged from 19% to 37%. 
It a party does, in fact, become an "agent" or "intermediary" 
in a particular transaction, there is usually discussion and 
agreement as to what the "cormnission" or "consideration" is 
going to be. There is absolutely no testimony or evidence 
that there was any such discussion or agreement between Brown 
and Mallory. This fact is another in the totality of facts 
evidencing that the arrangement between Brown and Mallory in 
the transaction which gave rise to the lawsuit which is the 
subject matter of this appeal was that of seller and purchaser 
or vendor and vendee, and not one of "agency" or "intermediary" 
or some similar relationship. 
The testimony and evidence adduced simply does not support 
Brown's contention that it served solely as an "intermediary'' 
who merely transmitted Mallory's P.0.s to Valad. 
Point III 
THE HEATERS DID NOT MEET REQUIRED PERFORMANCE 
CRITERIA AND THEY WERE NOT .TIMELY DELIVERED 
There is no question but that the heaters did not meet 
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Mallory's required performance criteria. Lee Farber, Mallory's 
president and general manager, testified in this regard 
(T. 39-40) : 
Q. Did you have any problems with the heaters at all? 
A. Yes. The heaters were deficient in capacity. They 
did not produce the capacity that we specified. And 
the sheath temperature exceeded the allowable 
temperature limits. 
Q. How do you know that they didn't meet the requirements, 
Mr. Farber? 
A. After we installed the heaters in the environmental 
chambers, we operated them. We conducted shop tests. 
We measured the voltage and amperage as an 
indication of the capacity. And we installed tempera-
ture sensors, thermal couples on the heaters, the 
heater sheaths, the heater fins and also in the air 
stream of the chamber to measure sheath temperature, 
fin temperature and chamber air temperature. 
The test results for the 21 KW and the 15 KW heaters are 
set forth in Exs. 24 and 25. By comparing the test results with 
the heater criteria furnished, and as explained by Mr. Farber 
in his testimony, it is evident that the heaters were defective. 
Ex. 24 shows that the actual heater capacity of the 21 KW 
heater was only slightly more than 16 kilowatts rather than 
the specified 21 kilowatts. Ex. 25 shows that the actual heater 
capacity of the 15 KW heater was only between 9 and 10 kilowatts 
rather than the specified 15 kilowatts. 
Brown's employee, Carl Nyman, not only examined the 
tests conducted by Mallory but he also conducted his own tests. 
He thereby confirmed that the heaters were in fact deficient. 
He advised Peter Cecchini of Valad of this. His testimony in 
part is (T. 333-4): 
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Q. Did you advise him (Peter Cecchini) that he had 
failed - that Valad had failed to furnish the 
heaters that were required by your (Brown's) 
order? 
A. We did. And advised him specifically that they 
(the heaters) were tested to produce too low a 
kilowatt delivery and that the sheath temperatures 
exceeded the specified figure. 
Strabo Laboratories, Inc., an independent testing lab in 
Salt Lake City, at the special request of Valad and in the 
presence of representatives from Valad and Mallory, made other 
tests. (Ex. 38) The tests at the Strabo lab gave about the 
same performance results as the tests made by Mallory and Brown. 
Even though Valad, at page 26 of its brief, argues about the 
so-called "unrefuted and irrefutable evidence of the 
unreliability of Mallory's tests", Valad admits that the Strabo 
lab tests "exhibit results similar to the Mallory tests". The 
independent Strabo lab tests confirmed absolutely that the 
heaters were deficient in capacity. 
Valad made its own tests. However, the tests Valad made 
apparently were only made to certify as to the accuracy of 
the thermostats and not to certify as to the performance of the 
heaters. The testimony of Geoffrey Mccarron, production 
manager of Valad, with reference to the tests made by Valad 
is as follows (T. 556): 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
O.K. Now, in response to the question that was just 
asked you by your counsel, you said that you did make 
tests on the 21 KW heater and that it was done in 
your presence at your plant at the Valad plant? 
Yes, sir. 
What did the test consist of? 
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A. The same test as we made on the 1500, which was 
to certify as to the accuracy of the thermostats 
that they would maintain the 250 degree maximum 
sheath temperature. 
Q. And that's all? 
A. That is specifically why the test was made, yes. 
It is very evident by the testimony from all of Valad's 
witnesses as well as by the arguments in Valad's brief that 
Valad was using limit thermostats in the heaters as the means 
for controlling temperatures rather than as "fail safe" devices. 
If the limit stats were used to control sheath temperatures, 
and the testimony of Valad's witnesses and the arguments of 
Valad's counsel evidences that this was the case, then 
irrefutably and by its own admissions Valad's heaters did not 
meet the requirements specified by Mallory. 
There were no limit stats or controllers called for by 
any purchase orders issued by Mallory to Brown. (T. 54 and 
Exs. 9, 12 and 14) However, if Valad had not installed any 
thermostats, Mallory would have done so as "fail safe" devices 
only in case everything else in the heater system failed. 
(T. 52 and 107) Mallory's purchase orders to Brown for the 
15 KW and the 21 KW heaters required that " ... sheath tempera-
ture will not exceed +250°F when operating at continuous full 
voltage. . " Very simply the requirement was that there be 
continuous full voltage. If the limit stats interrupted the 
flow of current the heaters failed the performance test (T. 186) 
because you could no longer get full capacity out of the heaters 
(T. 185). 
-20-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With reference to the use of limit stats to control 
heater temperatures, Mr. Farber of Mallory on cross-examination 
by Brown's attorney, testified as follows (T. 212): 
Q. And it is never intended by the manufacturer, by the 
user or anyone else that the limit stat that keeps 
the house from being burned down by some other 
disaster that goes wrong with the rest of the controls 
should be used as a control to regulate the heat of 
that furnace, is it? 
A. I can't speak for the manufacturer, but I can speak 
for Mallory Engineering and say absolutely not. 
Q. All right. That's my point. So that any design in 
these heaters which you have referred to that 
intended to utilize the thermostat which is shown on 
drawing number 119, and I show you Exhibit No. 17, 
and the thermostat which you referred to as being 
one of the typical thermostats or the limit stats 
I think is the word you have used? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That intended to use the limit stat as a means of 
controlling the operation of the burner so that it 
didn't get too - or that it produced the heat, would 
be incorrect in its design? 
A. Absolutely. 
In referring to Ex. 9 which was Mallory's P,O. to Brown 
for the 15 KW and the 21 KW heaters, Mr. Nyman of Brown said 
(T. 233): 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Let me direct your attention now to a portion of that 
exhibit which reads down here "fabricator shall 
submit written certification that sheath temperature 
will not exceed 250 degrees Farenheit when operating 
at continuous full voltage with a 5 FPC air velocity 
and a maximum air temperature of plus 260 degrees 
Fahrenheit." Did I correctly read that? 
With two exceptions. It is 5 FPS. And at a maximum 
air temperature of 160 Fahrenheit. 
Can you tell us what that phrase means, at continuous 
full voltage, in your opinion as an electrical engineer? 
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A. My interpretation is that the particular heater 
should, when operating at its designed voltage and 
at its designed power production, with the air 
velocity moving across it as specified, should have 
a sheath temperature not exceeding the specified 
250 degrees. 
Q. Now, we have heard a lot of testimony, Mr. Nyman, 
about thermostats. If a thermostat were put on to 
interrupt the flow, would that comply with the 
requirements of that specification in your opinion? 
A. In my opinion it would not. 
The testimony of Mr. Donald C. Thomas, a completely 
independent professional electrical engineer with considerable 
experience in designing heaters, with reference to the use of 
thermostats to control sheath temperatures, is most revealing. 
Mr. Thomas first spoke about the tests which were conducted by 
Valad which were conducted solely for the purpose of certifying 
as to the accuracy of the thermostats. Mr. Thomas said 
(T. 598-600): 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Mr. Thomas, I think you heard testimony concerning 
certain tests conducted by Valad in New York on 
certain of these heaters? 
Yes, sir. 
And my recollection of their testimony is the tests 
were made primarily to determine whether or not the 
thermostats worked? 
Yes, sir. 
Do you recall the testimony concerning what they said 
the temperatures showed and what the maximum temperature 
showed - or let me put a question first. 
Here these tests (Valad's) conducted with the - with 
a flow of air or with still air, according to the 
testimony as you remember it? 
The testimony as I remember it was a lab test, bench 
test, where there was no flow of air but the atmospheric 
conditions in a room. 
Do you recall what was said concerning the amount of 
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temperatures that were arrived at, both as to when 
the thermostats went on and the maximum temperatures 
that were reached? 
A. I think I remember that the maximum - I am not sure. 
They referred to a chart. Maybe if I looked at the 
chart. 
The maximum reached was approximately 250, and cut 
down to 225 after. It might have been 225, 220. 
I'd have to see the chart. 
This chart indicates apparently on the initial swing, 
as I would interpret it, that the temperature went 
above 250, swung down to 200 and after that, almost 
in the sine wave, went from 250 to 200 degrees. 
Q. Do you recall any other testimony concerning the 
temperature reaching close to 500 degrees on a 
certain test that was conducted? 
A. Yes, sir. I remember that 598 degrees, apparently 
was reached when this thermostat was not connected. 
Q. What would that indicate to you, Mr. Thomas? 
A. That 598, if I interpreted what I heard right, was 
the sheath temperature in which specifications say 
that should not exceed 250 degrees. In other words, 
I would assume that this thermostat is bein5 used to 
control the heater down to swin between 25 and 200 
egrees. Emp asis supp ie 
Q. Is this a proper use of a thermostat, Mr. Thomas? 
A. It could be a proper use. In this case, with the 
s ecifications as I read them, it calls for 15 KW 
at continuous u vo tage. Emp asis supp ie 
Q. So, when you are reading it in connection with these 
specifications, in this purchase order (Mallory's) 
which says continuous full voltage, would that be in 
compliance with this purchase order? 
A. No sir. I would say that in that my interpretation 
of these specifications are that I am to have the 
use of the 15 KW of heaters all the time, and they 
will maintain a sheath temperature of 250 degrees. 
I don't see here where the 15 KW should be cut off to 
comply with the 250 degrees. 
Specifically referring to the electrical heater criteria 
set forth in Ex. 4 (Mallory's "electrical heater criteria") and 
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the requirements of Mallory's P.O. (Ex. 9) for the 15 KW and 
the 21 KW heaters, Mr. Thomas testified further as follows 
(T. 602): 
Q. Is a thermostat a proper method of controlling sheath 
temperature, or is that really a design function? 
A. According to these specifications, it must be a 
design function. Without any outside control, the 
sheath temperature should not go above 250 degrees. 
Later Mr. Thomas said (T. 609): 
Q. Mr. Thomas, you have seen these heaters. You have 
seen the Strabo tests. You have seen the tests that 
were taken at the Mallory lab which were examined by 
Mr. Nyman, and I think Mr. Brown saw some of those 
tests, and the representative of Valad examined some 
of the tests. 
Did these heaters meet the requirements of the 
purchase orders which Mallory sent to Ted R. Brown 
& Company? 
A. No sir. 
The Valad heaters simply did not meet Mallory's required 
performance criteria. That is no doubt why Brown says in its 
brief at page 16: 
.Brown does not dispute the contention of Mallory 
that the heaters supplied by Valad were defective and 
were not manufactured in accordance with the mandate of 
the purchase order of Mallory. . . " 
Not only were the heaters defective, they were not timely 
delivered, and, time was of the essence, After Carl Nyman of 
Brown secured heater criteria from Mallory, he then on behalf 
of Brown gave Mallory some price quotes and delivery dates for 
the 15 and the 21 KW heaters Brown wanted to sell Mallory. 
The quoted delivery dates submitted by Brown to Mallory in 
writing were 8 to 10 weeks, (Ex, 4, T, 10 a~d 193) Mallory, 
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however, couldn't live with the quoted delivery dates, As 
testified to by Mr. Farber of Mallory (T. 685, lines 13-30 and 
T. 686, lines 1-6): 
A .... I personally discussed with Mr. Nyman that I 
could not give Ted R. Brown a purchase order for 
the heaters based upon an eight to ten week delivery 
schedule, and that one of the purchases - conditions 
of the purchase order would be six weeks. 
Q. Was that put in the purchase order? 
A. That was put in the purchase order. 
Q. That's the purchase order 4016 that's one of the 
exhibits in this record at this trial? 
A. Yes, sir. That was not only put in the purchase order 
as a promised date, that was put in the purchase order 
as a guaranteed date, because the significance of that 
is that these pieces of equipment were very large that 
we were working with. They occupied most of our shop 
space. And for us to effectively schedule our work, 
we had to bring this work along in the shop so that our 
part of the job would be completed, ready to receive the 
heaters, when they were installed. 
In addition to the delivery date of the heaters, it was 
also specified that within two weeks, we would have 
shop drawings, because Mallory could only fabricate 
the chamber up to what we call a head wall. And then 
we could not fabricate the heat wall until we knew 
the structural configuration of the heaters so that 
we could make our heater arrangement in the head wall. 
Accordingly, when Mallory did sub~it its P.O. to Brown 
for the heaters, Mallory expressly set forth therein that (Ex. 9): 
II 
.Shop drawings required within 2 weeks .. " 
" .Delivery guaranteed within 6 weeks. II 
The heaters were in fact delivered late. In this connection, 
Mr. Farber, during the course of his cross-examination by Brown's 
attorney responded (T. 72-73): 
" .The first problem was on Job 281 where the heaters 
were late, in the first place, and when they were finally 
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delivered, in our opinion, the heaters, didn't perform in 
accordance with specification requirements. 
The other two problems were on Job No. 277 and Job No. 
285 where orders were accepted by Brown with the condi-
tion that time was of the essence and this was verbally 
communicated to Borwn, that they had to be delivered on 
time. 
And in some purchase orders the time was guaranteed and 
we did not get even delivery of the heaters, and at one 
point in time there was around $400,000 worth of work, 
of Mallory work being held up that we couldn't complete. 
That, at our normal yearly volume of doing business, 
represented about ninety percent of our work in process 
at this particular time. So it was an urgent critical 
thing with Mallory Engineering to get our heater problems 
solved ... " 
Even before any heaters were delivered Mr. Farber was 
gravely concerned because the shop drawings were not furnished 
Mallory within the required two weeks. On cross-examination by 
Brown's attorney, Mr. Farber not only expressed his deep concern 
about this but he also said what he did about it as follows 
(T. 117): 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
... Now, when did you first become concerned with 
regard to whether or not the manufactured product 
prepared by Valad was going to meet your requirements? 
I first became concerned with the overall project when 
Mallory Engineering did not receive the shop drawings 
within two weeks, within the guaranteed time. 
And did you ask for an explanation of this? 
Not only did I ask for an explanation, I constantly 
hounded Carl Nyman to produce those documents so 
we could make the elevation - or so we could determine 
how we were going to mount these heaters in our 
equipment that was currently being fabricated. 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record which 
challenges the fact that as between Mallory and Brown, time 
was of the essence. The testimony of Brown's employee, Carl 
Nyman, dramatically and affirmatively demonstrates this. 
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Brown was buying heaters from Valad to re-sell to Mallory, 
and, in order to meet its contract commitment to Mallory, 
Br0Wil had to see that Valad shipped the heaters timely. Valad 
did not ship the heaters timely and so, of course, Brown was 
concerned. The testimony of Brown's employee, Carl Nyman, 
demonstrating his concern about the heaters being delivered 
late is (T. 343-5): 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
(By Mr. Tibbals) A great deal of discussion has been 
had, Mr. Nyman, during the course of this trial, as 
to deficiencies on the delivery schedule of Valad. 
Did you have any understanding at any time, verbally 
or in writing, with Valad as to when these machines 
or these heaters were to be delivered? 
Yes, we did. 
How was that manifested? Was it a verbal conversation 
or was it in writing? 
It was initially a verbal conversation. I would have 
to examine the exhibits to see if it appears on the 
written quotations, but I believe it does. 
I now hand you exhibit first, No. 46, and ask you 
to examine that and be sure that that relates to the 
heaters that we are discussing in this case? 
Yes, it does. 
Does it contain any information with regard to delivery 
schedule? 
The delivery schedule quoted was between six and eight 
weeks. 
And what was the date of that instrument? 
This particular quotation is dated December 6 of 1972. 
Now, what does that mean in the industry, six or eight 
weeks from what? 
From the time of receipt of an order until the time 
shipment or delivery is made. 
So that since that document that you have in your hand 
relates to the 15 kilowatt heaters, it would appear 
that the time should then be computed from the date of 
receipt of Exhibit 10 and 11? 
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A. Yes. That is correct. Uh-huh. 
Q. So that since those instruments are dated December 15 
and December 20 respectively, 10, 15 and 11, the 20th, 
the six to eight weeks should start from the receipt 
of this order by Valad; isn't that true? 
A. This is correct. 
Q. Were they shipped within that time? 
A. They were not. 
Q. Was this deficiency called to the attention of Valad? 
A. It was, in several communications. 
tions were conducted with Valad to 
shipment and to obtain the heaters 
required. 
Telephone communica-
try to expedite the 
when they were 
Q. Did Valad ever communicate directly, to your knowledge, 
with Mallory concerning the delay in shipment? 
A. Yes, he did. On a particular instance he provided them 
with a letter of explanation of the delays. 
Valad simply cannot claim now that time was not of the essence. 
Valad promised delivery of the 15 KW and the 21 KW heaters within 
6 to 8 weeks. Peter Cecchini of Valad admits this. In testifying 
as to the promised delivery of the 15 KW heater he refers to 
a telephone conversation he had with Mr. Nyman of Brown on 12-5-72 
and says (T. 373 line 9): 
" .I gave him delivery of six to eight weeks .. II 
As to the promised delivery of the 21 KW heater Mr. Cecchini told 
Mr. Nyman (T. 374 line 22): 
" .And I gave delivery of six to eight weeks .. 
II 
The testimony of Valad's employee, Peter Cecchini, and the 
notes he made of a telephone conversation he had on 3-26-73 with 
Carl Nyman of Brown show that the 36 KW and the 50 KW heaters 
were to be shipped April 5th. (T. 475 lines 13-23) Mr. Cecchini 
admitted Valad had approved shop drawings for the 12 KW, the 15 
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KW and the 36 KW heaters. (T. 476, lines 14-17) He admitted 
further that even though Valad didn't have approved shop drawings 
for the SO KW heater, he nevertheless, represented to Mr. Nyman 
of Brown that the SO KW heater would be shipped April Sth. Mr. 
Cecchini also admitted that after Mallory got into the act 
because of the defective heaters which were delivered, Mr. Farber 1 
of Mallory inquired many times as to when the heaters would be 
delivered. 
Those heaters which were delivered were delivered late. This I 
is not disputed by anyone. The 36 KW and the SO KW heaters 
were never delivered. There is no question but that time was of 
the essence. Valad's apparent assertion now that time was not 
of the essence simply does not square with the undisputed facts 
and is without merit. 
Point IV 
THE DAMAGES THE COURT AWARDED MALLORY MERELY 
COMPENSATED MALLORY FOR ONLY THOSE DAMAGES 
MALLORY ACTUALLY SUSTAINED AND THOSE WHICH WERE 
WITHIN THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE PARTIES 
The general rule applicable to recoverable damages is set 
forth in 22 Am Jur 2d - Damages - Sec. 12, page 28 as follows: 
"Com ensation is the stated oal of Courts in awardin 
or tortious injury or or reach o a contractual 
promise ... With contracts, compensation is most often 
stated in terms of placing the Plaintiff in the same 
financial position in which he would have been had the 
promise not been broken." (Emphasis supplied) 
The same general rule is expressed just a little differently in 
2S CJS - Damages - Sec. 71, page 836, providing in part: 
" ... the measure of damages is such sum as will compensate 
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the person injured for the loss sustained, with the least 
hardship to the wrongdoer consistent with the idea of fair 
compensation, and with the duty of the person injured to 
exercise reasonable care to mitigate the injury, according 
to the opportunities which may fairly be or appear to be 
within his reach; and the same rule obtains whether the 
loss is claimed for in"ur to ersonal in'ur , or 
breach o contract. Emp 
While both Brown and Valad in their respective briefs cite 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code as precluding at least some of 
the damages which the Court awarded, neither of them cited all 
of the pertinent provisions of that Code which specifically 
allow and justify all the damages which the Court awarded 
Mallory. The provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
which are applicable are Secs. 70A-2-711, 712, 713, 714 and 715, 
UCA 1953 as amended. 
70A-2-711 provides in part: 
"(l)Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates 
or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes 
acceptance then with respect to any goods involved .. 
. the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done 
so may in addition to recovering so much of the price 
as has been paid 
(a)"cover" and have damages ... 
(b)recover damages for nondelivery ... (Emphasis supplied) 
70A-2-712 provides in part: 
"(l)After a breach within the preceding section the buyer 
may "cover" by making in good faith and without unreason-
able delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to 
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the 
seller. 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the 
difference between the cost of cover and the contract 
rice to ether with an incidental or conse uential 
damages as hereina ter defined. . . Emphasis supplied) 
70A-l-713 provides in part: 
"(l)Subject to the provisions of this chapter ... the 
measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiatIOD by the 
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seller is the difference between the market price at 
the time when the bu er learned of the breach and the 
contract rice to ether with an incidenta an 
consequentia . Emp asis supp ie 
70A-2-714 provides in part: 
given notification 
of 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warrant is the 
difference at the time and place of acceptance between 
the value of the good accepted and the value they would 
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special 
circuo.stances show roximate dama es of a different 
amount. Emp asis supp ie 
(3) 
70A-2-715 provides in part: 
"(l)Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach 
include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, 
receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods 
rightfully rejected, any connnercially reasonable 
charges, expenses or connnissions in connection with 
effecting cover and an other reasonable ex ense incident 
to the delay or ot er reach. Emp asis supp ie 
(2) Conse*uential damages resulting from the seller's 
breac include 
or 
There is no question but that Mallory sustained substantial 
damages, and, that it did everything reasonably possible to mitigat< 
its damages by expeditiously securing heaters from another source 
which met the required performance criteria to replace the 
defective heaters which were fabricated by Valad and sold to 
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Mallory by Brown. In this connection Brown states in its 
brief at page 29: 
"It was conceded at the trial that the cost of securing 
replacement heaters and the incidental costs to reconstruct 
the test chambers to fit the new heaters, the cost of 
removal of the defective heaters and the installation of 
the new heaters were direct costs and under the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code were allowable items of damage to be awarded 
to Mallory against Valad and if the Court refused to accept 
Brown's theory of the case, against Brown. . . " 
Not only were the "direct costs" allowable items of damage 
but so were the "indirect costs". They were not speculative or 
conjectural. They comprised only a fair and just pro-rata 
allocation of the overhead expenses to the very Jobs affected 
by the defective heaters on a "completed-contract method" of 
accounting basis. Mallory's accounting was not done by Mallory's 
employees but by Elwood and Barnes, a Certified Public Accounting 
Firm in Salt Lake City, Utah. The "completed-contract method" 
of accounting for income and expenses was the method used by 
Mallory from its inception and is authorized and approved by the 
Internal Revenue Service, See Sec. 451 of the 1954 Internal 
Revenue Code and the Regulations promulgated thereunder, Sec. 1.451-3 
(2) . 
A fair and reasonable allocation of "overhead expenses'' is 
a proper element of recoverable damages. In an annotation in 
3 ALR 3rd dealing with the subject of DAMAGES - OVERHEAD EXPENSES, 
it is stated in the Summary and comment in Sec. 2 at page 692 
that: 
"If the defendant has been responsible for the plaintiff's 
incurring or wasting reasonably forseeable overhead expenses, 
it is generally agreed that the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover damages as reimbursement for his outlay of such 
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overhead e'i¥enses. (See Secs. 7-10, infra.) If, however, 
the plainti f's claim for damages is based on the theory 
that the defendant has prevented the plaintiff from carry-
ing out certain transactions and has thereby been responsible 
for causing theplaintiff a loss of profits, there can be a 
divergence of opinion as to whether or not ~he plaintiff 
must deduct the overhead expenses allocable to the 
unperformed transactions in computing the amount of lost 
profits recoverable from the defendant; and to the extent 
that the plaintiff is not required to deduct such overhead 
expenses in computing the amount of his damages recoverable 
for lost profits, these overhead ex enses are of necessit 
included as an element o amages. - , in ra. 
Mallory did not and does not seek lost profits as part of its 
damages but only those damages actually sustained which normally 
and particularly in this case include a portion of Mallory's 
overhead expenses. 
The same annotation on damages and overhead expenses in 3 
ALR 3rd states at page 695: 
"If the plaintiff has wasted or otherwise incurred 
overhead expenses as a result of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct (such as a tort or breach of contract), and the 
plaintiff is seeking to obtain reimbursement for such 
outlay, it is enerall a reed that the overhead ex enses, 
to the extent ocated, 
are recovera 
* * * 
" ... it would appear that the defendant often knows or 
has reason to know that overhead expenses will be 
allocable to transactions which he wrongfully prevents 
or delays the plaintiff from carrying out, and this 
principle has received recognition both in modern 
decisions and in modern statutes," 
The above annotation cites numerous cases where overhead 
expenses were allowable by the Courts as an element of recoverable 
damages. 
This Court in the case of Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 
Utah 2d 49, 448 P2d 709, said: 
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'_'Speaking generally about damages, the desired objective 
is to.evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct, 
practical and accurate method that can be employed." 
In the case of Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company vs. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P2d 
906, the District Court had included attorneys fees in its 
award of damages in an action on a construction contractor's 
performance bond. The award of attorney's fees was challenged 
because such fees were not provided for by statute or by the 
express provisions of the bond. Nevertheless, this Court said 
at page 907: 
"The rule as to what damages are recoverable for breach 
of contract is based upon the concept of reasonable 
forseeability that loss of such general character would 
result from the breach. Therefore, to be compensable, 
the loss must result from the breach in the natural and 
usual course of events, so that it can fairly and reason-
ably be said that if the ~inds of the parties had 
averted to breach when the contract was made, loss of 
such character would have been within their contemplation. 
Applying the above rule to this case: it could reasonably 
be foreseen that the natural and usual consequence of 
Cassady's failure to pay the laborers and materialmen would 
bring about the series of events which occurred: that liens 
would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to enforce 
them; that plaintiff Title Company, having the duty to keep 
the titles clear, would interpose defenses and attend to 
some disposition of the claims, which would require the 
services of attorneys and court costs incidental thereto. 
That is the type of loss for which Hartford's bond was given 
to guard against." 
The specific details of all the damages which follow in 
fact need not necessarily be within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the contract to be recoverable. As 
pointed out in 22 Am Jur 2d - Damages - Sec. 58: 
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"The principle that damages, to be recoverable, must have 
been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
contract was entered into, does not require the defaulting 
party to know the specific details of the injury or of 
the damages which followed in fact. For example, it is 
sufficient if the defaulting party could, at the time the 
contract was entered into, foresee that failure to make 
delivery would cause the nondefaulting party's factory 
to shut down. . . " 
See also Kelley, M. & Co. v. La Crosse Carriage Co., 120 Wis. 
84, 97 NW 674. 
In a rather detailed discussion and analysis of the various 
remedies of the buyer under the Uniform Commercial Code set forth 
in 67 Am Jur 2d - Sales - Secs, 664-667, Sec. 667 at page 864 
provides in part: 
" ... The term 'consequential damages' is not itself 
precisely defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, but it 
would seem to cover damages other than those standarized 
in various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which 
might flow proximately from the breach by the seller, and 
might be equivalent to what are sometimes called 'special 
damages'." 
The attention of this Court is respectfully invited to the 
annotation in 3 ALR 3rd which in Sec. 10 at pages 710-711 reviews 
several cases holding that overhead expenses are recoverable 
as an element of damages. Also, several additional cases to 
the same effect are cited in the supplement to that annotation. 
Carl Nyman, Brown's employee, was well aware of the fact 
that Mallory was building environmental units for the government. 
He had previously been instrumental on behalf of Brown in selling 
Mallory many thousands of dollars of equipment and instrumentation 
devices. He obviously wanted to sell more items to Mallory. 
The electrical heaters which Mallory required for the environmental 
units fell naturally within his sales line because he himself 
was an electrical engineer and he knew Mallory's needs. 
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The environmental units Mallory was manufacturing for the 
government were very large and occupied most of Mallory's shop 
space. (T. 685 lines 25-6) At one point in time, approximately 
$400,000.00 worth of work or about 90% of Mallory's work was 
being held up (T. 73 lines 3 to 6) because of the heaters Brown 
had contracted to sell Mallory and have delivered to Mallory 
within definite time schedules. Brown knew absolutely that time 
was of the essence. Brown has never denied this and has 
admitted that the heaters were not timely delivered. Because of 
the defective heaters Mallory could do nothing more with the 
bulk of the work in its shop and Mallory's overhead expenses 
were going on every day. (T.80) Mallory did the only reasonable 
thing it could do to mitigage and minimize its damages by 
securing heaters meeting required performance criteria from 
another source. Mallory did this however only after both Valad 
and Brown refused and failed to do anything about the defective 
heaters. 
Brown, under all of the foregoing circumstances, either knew 
or reasonably should have known that the natural, reasonable and 
readily forseeable consequences of Brown's failure to deliver 
Mallory heaters meeting required performance criteria as Brown 
had contracted to do, would be the very da:r;i.ages which Mallory 
actually sustained. In this connection it is undisputed that 
Brown also tried to prevail upon Valad to do something about 
the situation so as to mitigate the damages which Brown knew and 
recognized were accruing. 
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Point V 
BROWN'S CLAil1 TO BEING MERELY AN "INTERMEDIARY" IS 
UNFOUNDED, AND, THE CASES BROWN CITES TO CAST ALL 
BLAME ON VALAD AND EXONERATE BROWN FROM LIABILITY 
DO NOT SUPPORT BROWN IN THIS REGARD BUT ESTABLISH 
THAT MALLORY CAN RECOVER AGAINST BROWN AND VALAD 
Brown, in endeavoring to exonerate itself from liability, 
states in Point Ill of its brief at page 26 that" ... Brown 
should not be involved in the controversy which basically 
involves only Mallory and Valad ... "purportedly because, 
as Brown states further, " ... the parties throughout have 
treated Brown as a mediator or intermediary ... " These state-
ments are simply not true. 
Brown was not Mallory's agent or intermediary. Mallory 
contracted to purchase heaters from Brown and Brown contracted 
to sell heaters to Mallory. Brown defaulted on that contract. 
During the course of the proceedings the unchallenged and 
unchallengeable statement made by Mr. Schmidt, Valad's attorney 
was (T. 615 lines 23-28): 
" ... there is nothing in the record to dispute the 
fact that the only relationship between Mallory and 
Brown was that of purchaser and seller. And there is 
nothing in the record to dispute the fact that as between 
Brown and Valad the relationship was purely one of 
purchaser and seller." 
Brown's own employee, Carl Nyman, admitted that he never 
represented to Valad that he was an "agent" or "representative" 
of Mallory or that he was an "intermediary" or "conduit" for 
Mallory. (T. 351 lines 15-21) There were discussions which did 
take place between Brown and Valad about Brown becoming a 
representative of Valad but these never materialized. (T. 327-8) 
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On being questioned by Brown's attorney as to why Valad 
sent certain shop drawings to Mallory, Mr. Cecchini of Valad 
replied (T. 442 lines 9-13): 
A. . .. The order is with T. R. Brown & Associates. And 
I was told by T. R. Brown & Associates, who is my 
customer, to send it to Mallory Engineering. 
Q. So you did what you were told? 
A. That is correct. 
In further discussing the relationship between Brown and Valad, 
Mr. Cecchini of Valad said (T. 482 lines 7 through 17): 
Q. Who was your customer? 
A. T. R. Brown. 
Q. Your customer was never Mallory, was it? 
A. No. 
Q. But the order was that you send the heater to Mallory. 
That was really the only relationship? 
A. That was who it was shipped to. 
Q. And to whom were you to bill? 
A. T. R. Brown. 
Q. Because they were your customer? 
A. That is correct. 
That Brown was not a mere "intermediary" but the actual 
seller and that Mallory was the buyer of the heaters was 
recognized and acknowledged by the Trial Court which was in the 
advantaged position of seeing and hearing the witnesses, 
observing their demeanor, judgine their biases and prejudices, 
and personally examining the exhibits adduced at the trial. In 
this connection the Trial Court remarked (T. 294 lines 24-27): 
"THE COURT: Well, I know what the relationship between 
the plaintiff (Mallory) and Brown is. That's evident 
from the exhibits, and that's vendor-vendee, at least in 
the initial staees ... "(Emphasis supplied) 
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In striving to exonerate itself from liability and cast all 
responsibility on Valad, Brown cites two Washington cases. One 
case is that of Freeman v. Navarre, 47 Wash. 2d 153, 289 P2d 
1015. Brown acknowledges that the factual situation in the 
Freeman v. Navarre case is different from the case here on appeal. 
Nevertheless, Brown states in its brief at page 28 that the 
Freeman v. Navarre case supports Brown's theory of non-liability 
as far as Brown is concerned because it " ... recognized that 
one servine as a conduit is not liable for the mal-performance 
or non-performance of a third party contractor." The actual 
holding of the case is only that even without "privity of contract" 
an ultimate user of a product may sue the manufacturer. 
In the first place, in this case on appeal, Brown was not 
a mere "conduit" or "intermediary". Brown was the seller and 
Mallory was the buyer of the heaters manufactured by Valad. 
The Freeman v. Navarre case concerned itself primarily with the 
legal concept of "privity of contract". It had to decide the 
issue as to whether the user of an article with no privity of 
contract with the manufacturer could sue and recover from the 
manufacturer because of a defect in the manufactured article. 
The exact language of the Court during the course of its 
decision in part was" 
" ... It follows that the only question presented here 
is whether appellant, the ultimate user can recover from 
respondent, the manufacturer." 
The court held the user could recover from the manufacturer. The 
case does not support Brown's theory that the seller (Brown in 
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this case) is relieved of responsibility. On the contrary, 
it supports Mallory's claim that Mallory (the buyer of the 
heaters from Brown) cannot only recover from the defaulting 
seller (Brown) but also from the manufacturer (Valad) even 
though there may not have been any privity of contract between 
Mallory and Valad. 
The other Washington case Brown cites in its attempt to 
relieve Brown of any liability and place the entire blame on 
Valad is the case of Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 
Inc., 422 P2d 496. Brown even states in its brief at page 27 
that the Washington Court in the Kadiak case " .was confronted 
with an almost factually parallel situation. " as the case 
here on appeal. The Kadiak case is factually distinguishable 
and legally non-supportive of Brown's attempt to relieve Brown 
of responsibility and liability. 
In the interest of clarity and brevity, the parties in the 
Kadiak v. Murphy case hereafter will simply be referred to as 
follows: The plaintiff, Kadiak Fisheries Co., the owner of a 
fishing vessel which needed a new motor, will be referred to as 
Kadiak. One of the defendants in that case, Alaska Pacific 
Supply Company, the actual "Sales Agent'' for the motor manufacturer 
Murphy Diesel Co., will be referred to as Alaska Pacific. And, 
the motor manufacturer and other defendant, Murphy Diesel Co., will 
be referred to as Murphy. 
The Kadiak V. Murphy case was an action by Kadiak, the 
vessel owner, against the motor manufacturer's "Sales Agent", 
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Alaska Pacific, and the motor manufacturer, Murphy, based on 
negligence and breach of implied warranties of fitness and 
merchantability. In the case on appeal here, Mallory did not 
and does not base its case on the theory of negligence. Mallory's 
case was and is a "breach of contract" action against Brown for 
Brown having furnished Mallory defective heaters which Brown 
sold Mallory, and for Brown not furnishing Mallory other heaters 
which Brown sold Mallory, as well as an action by Mallory aga:inst 
Valad on a "third-party beneficiary" theory and because the 
heaters Valad manufactured did not meet the written certifications 
Valad furnished Mallory. 
It is of particular significance to note that in the Kadiak 
v. Murphy case, Alaska Pacific was actually the "Sales Agent" 
of Murphy, the motor manufacturer, while in this case, Brown was 
not the "Sales Agent" of Valad nor an agent for Mallory. In fact, 
in this case, no "Sales Agent" was involved because Brown was 
the seller and Mallory was the buyer of the heaters as between 
Brown and Mallory, and as between Valad and Brown, Valad was the 
seller and Brown was the buyer. 
In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, both the manufacturer, Murphy, 
and the "Sales Agent", Alaska Pacific, denied negligence and any 
breach of implied warranty. No writing was involved in that case 
such as is involved in this case by virtue of the written 
certifications from the heater manufacturer, Valad, to Mallory, 
the ultimate consumer. In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, the 
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--
manufacturer, Murphy, alleged lack of privity of contract between 
it and the vessel owner, Kadiak. Also, the "Sales Agent", 
Alaska Pacific, (which "Sales Agent" is lacking in this case), 
asserted a cross-claim against the motor manufacturer, Murphy, 
its principal. 
At the conclusion of Kadiak's evidence, Alaska Pacific was 
allowed to amend, over Kadiak's objections, to assert the 
defense of estoppel against Kadiak. At the end of all the evidence, 
Kadiak's claims of breach of warranty against Alaska Pacific, and 
Alaska Pacific's defense of estoppel against Kadiak and its 
cross-claim against Murphy were withdrawn from the jury. The 
issues of negligence, breach of implied warranties, privity of 
contract, contributory negligence and damages remained and were 
submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict against 
Murphy and exonerated Alaska Pacific. Murphy appealed. After 
the appeal, Kadiak, Murphy and Alaska Pacific stipulated that 
Alaska Pacific, the "Sales Agent", was not a party respondent 
so that the appeal was limited to the controversy between the 
vessel owner, Kadiak, and the motor manufacturer, Murphy, and 
that in the event of a new trial, the "Sales Agent", Alaska 
Pacific, would not be a party defendant. Accordingly, the parties 
stipulated that the jury verdict and judgment of dismissal as 
to the "Sales Agent", Alaska Pacific, was final. In the course 
of its decision the Supreme Court of Washington among other 
things, said: 
". . . under the issues as ultimately framed and 
submitted to the jury, the theories of responsibility 
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and liability as between Murphy Diesel, the 
manufacturer, and Alaska Pacific, the sales conduit 
(THE MANUFACTURER'S "SALES AGENT"), were not equal -
Murphy Diesel could be found liable upon either one 
of two theories (breach of warranty or negligence) , 
whereas Alaska Pacific's (THE MANUFACTURER'S "SALES 
AGENT'S" ia i it was restricte to t e t eor 
neg igence in connection wit t e sa e an insta 
tion of the motor." (Emphasis and designations of 
"Sales Agent" supplied.) 
Thus, the Kadiak v. Murphy case and this case are readily 
distinguishable. In the Kadiak v. Murphy case, negligence was 
the only possible theory of liability against the acknowledged 
manufacturer's "Sales Agent". In this case no "Sales Agent" 
was involved and at least insofar as Mallory's claims against 
either Brown or Valad are involved, the theory of negligence 
is not applicable. The theory of liability against Brown is 
breach of contract which Brown in fact breached by delivering 
or causing to be delivered defective heaters to Mallory and 
by failing to deliver to Mallory other heaters which Brown 
contracted to deliver. 
The Washington Court's reasoning in the Kadiak v. Murphy 
case as to the motor manufacturer's liability (Murphy) in that 
case, and the heater manufacturer's liability(Valad) in this 
case, is perfectly sound and justifies this Court in affirming 
the judgments awarded Mallory against both Brown and Valad. 
While in this case Mallory did not ask for and was not awarded 
"loss of profits" but only "actual damages", the Washington 
Court did, in fact, award damages for "lost profits" as a 
result of the lost time the fishing vessel encountered because 
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of the defective motor. During the course of its decision the 
Court said in 422 P2d at page 505: 
"In the instant case there can be little doubt under 
the evidence that Murphy Diesel was aware of the 
fishing function and purpose of the Jaguar in Kadiak's 
fleet. It was advised that the vessel was being 
repowered to continue its operations. There could, 
therefore, be virtuall no uestion as to the fact that 
oss o is in time ue to motor i icu ties wou 
resu t in a iminution o ro its. Li ewise t e 
evidence leaves itt e room or arfument t at t e 
Ja uar did lose time as a result o motor troubles. 
The on y e ement remaining, t en, or ispute is t e 
certainty of the amount of the lost profits occasioned 
by the Jaguar's incapacitation due to engine repairs. 
On this factor, however, Kadiak produced uncontradicted 
evidence revealing the average daily crab deliveries of 
other comparable vessels fishing in the same area in 
which the Jaguar was fishing on the occasions 
irmnediately prior to engine breakdowns. It also produced 
undisputed evidence bearing upon the average prices paid 
for the pertinent catches and the usual cost of operation. 
Under these circumstances, the jury was not required to 
speculate. It had only to weigh the credibility of the 
witnesses, for it was presented with a reasonable basis 
upon which ito determine the amount of the loss. " 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Neither the undisputed facts nor the cited case law support 
Brown's theory that it was a mere "intermediary" and, therefore, 
absolved from all liability. 
Point VI 
THE JUDGMENTS AGAINST BROWN AND VALAD ARE 
SUBSTANTIATED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT AND 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Brown contracted to sell Mallory heaters which would meet 
specified performance criteria. The heaters were to be delivered 
timely because time was of the essence which fact Brown knew 
and admits. However, none of the heaters were timely delivered. 
Furthermore, every heater which was delivered, including the 
12 KW heaters, were defective. Not one heater met the required 
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performance criteria although the 12 KW heaters were 
subsequently replaced with good heaters. Brown conceded 
that all heaters delivered were defective. Some of the 
heaters which Brown contracted to sell Mallory were never 
delivered and Brown never offered to do anything to replace the 
defective heaters nor to supply the heaters which were not 
delivered. Brown knew that the heaters it contracted to sell 
Mallory were for the environmental units Mallory was building 
for the government. Those environmental units were very large 
and in fact occupied most of Mallory's shop space and at one 
point in time constituted approximately 90% of Mallory's work 
in process. 
Valad, on the other hand, partly performed the contract 
it had with Brown by manufacturing some of the heaters which 
Valad shipped directly to Mallory pursuant to Brown's instruct-
ions. And, Valad billed Brown, not Mallory, for those heaters. 
As indicated above, all of the heaters Valad manufactured 
and shipped Mallory were defective. Valad did, however, replace 
the defective 12 KW heaters with good heaters. Although Valad 
never shipped some of the heaters, Valad expressly represented 
to both Brown and Mallory that the balance of the heaters would 
be shipped, and Valad also expressly represented to both Brown 
and Mallory the exact delivery dates for those heaters. 
Furthermore, Valad certified in writing to Mallory that the 15 
KW heaters and the 21 KW heaters Valad manufactured and shipped 
Mallory would, in fact, meet the required performance criteria. 
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However, the undisputed and undisputable evidence is that 
they did not. 
There is no question but that Mallory sustained 
substantial damages because of the defective heaters and that 
those damages were only the natural forseeable consequences 
of the heaters contracted for not being timely delivered as 
they should have been. The damages which Mallory sustained 
and for which judgments were awarded Mallory by the Court 
are substantiated by substantial competent and admissible 
evidence and the judgments should accordingly be affirmed. 
This Court has expressed itself many times on the 
standard rule of review in cases similar to the case presently 
being reviewed here by this Court. In the case of Fillmore 
City v. Reeve, 571 P2d 1316, Justice Crockett speaking for 
a unanimous Court said: 
" ... we follow the standard rule of review, that 
where the evidence is in conflict, we assume that 
the trial court believed those aspects of the 
evidence that support his findings. . . " 
Justice Hall, speaking for a unanimous Court in the case of 
Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P2d 393, said: 
"This Court has consistently followed the well-
recognized standard of appellate review which 
precludes the substitution of our judgment for 
that of the trial court on issues of fact, and where 
its findings and judgments are based on substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence we will not disturb 
them." 
In the case of Wash-a-Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P2d 632, Justice 
Ellett had this to say: 
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"The evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment 
made, and we should sustain the trial court even if 
we might have come to a different decision had we 
been trying the matter. . " 
Finally, in the case of Dalton v. Dalton, 6 Utah 2d 132, 307 
P2d 894, Justice Henriod said: 
" ... on review of a case of this kind we must view 
the facts in a light most favorable to defendants and 
we cannot disturb the conclusions of the trial court 
if, viewing the facts in such fashion, there is 
substantial competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's pronouncement." 
See also Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P2d 176, 
and Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P2d 182. 
The judgments awarded Mallory are supported by substantial 
competent admissible evidence and should be affirmed. 
'CONCLUSION 
The Judgments awarded Mallory against Brown and Valad 
are supported by substantial, competent, admissible evidence 
and in accordance with the law applicable in such cases. Those 
Judements should accordingly be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS 
and 
QUENTIN--Y:-:- R. ALSTON 
Attorneys for Mallory Engineering, Inc 
1558 South 1100 East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
467-5100 or 467-5109 
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